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ABSTRACT
The paper provides new insights into the role of financial liberalization in the South 
Korean financial crisis using a number of novel approaches. Firstly, primary
information regarding the relaxation of financial restraints, such as interest rate ceilings, 
capital controls and reserve requirements, is collected and summarised.  Secondly, this 
information is used to construct summary measures of financial liberalization.  Thirdly, 
qualitative information on the role of financial liberalization in the financial crisis is
presented from a new survey of 44 IM F, W orld Bank and Korean officials who had 
direct exposure to the events surrounding the financial crisis.  Fourthly, the effects of 
financial liberalization on the evolution of banking and financial risks are estimated
utilising a conditional CAPM  with time-varying market risk.  Finally, qualitative and 
quantitative findings are juxtaposed, allowing insights into the extent to which financial 
markets recognized the increased banking and financial risks, which emanated from 
financial liberalization.
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11. Introduction
Financial liberalization has recently becom e alm ost synonym ous to financial instability, 
especially but not exclusively so in the case of emerging market economies (Stiglitz,
2000; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999; Demetriades, 1999; Arestis and
Demetriades, 1999).  The most popular explanation for this infamous association is that 
financial liberalization usually fuels a lending boom, which funds the creation of an 
asset price bubble (e.g. Allen and Gale 2000). W hen the bubble bursts, collapsing
collateral values result in bank insolvencies and a credit crunch, resulting in severe 
recessions. In the recent financial crisis in East Asia1, the lending-boom explanation 
accords reasonably well with the experience of Thailand (Demetriades, 1999).
However, it does not appear to fit comfortably the case of South Korea, where there was 
hardly a detectable lending boom or an obvious asset price bubble. Instead, the Korean 
crisis appears to be very much a case of inadequately managed financial risks.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Korean financial intermediaries borrowed short in
foreign currencies and acquired low-quality foreign assets with longer maturities.  This 
created maturity and exchange rate mis-matches and increased overall credit risk, since 
even when exchange risk was hedged, it was substituted by increased credit risk
(Demetriades and Fattouh, 1999).
W hile a lot more is now known about the Korean crisis than at the time it erupted, there 
is very little evidence documenting the evolution of financial risks before the crisis. 
Perhaps more importantly, the role of financial liberalization in this process remains 
largely unknown or even unrecognised.  At best, existing discussions of the role of 
financial liberalization are based on anecdotal evidence.  At worst, the role of financial 
liberalization is neglected or misunderstood.  Yet, if there are any policy lessons to be 
learned from virtually any financial crisis they are almost inevitably related to the 
timing and implementation of financial reforms.
The paper provides new insights into the role of financial liberalization in the South 
Korean financial crisis using the following novel approaches. 
(i) Episodes of financial liberalization are documented by collecting primary
information from official publications on the relaxation of a variety of financial 
2restraints, including capital controls, interest rate ceilings and reserve
requirements on bank deposits.  This information is used to construct summary 
measures of financial liberalization, which are used in estimations.
(ii) New qualitative information on the mechanisms by which financial
liberalization led to increased banking and financial risks is presented.  This 
information is obtained from a new survey of 44 IM F, W orld Bank and Korean 
officials who had direct exposure to the events surrounding the Korean financial 
crisis. The survey was carried out in W ashington, D.C. during October 1999 and 
in Seoul during April 2000. The findings from the survey are tabulated and
analysed, providing a useful background to the formulation of an empirical
model.
(iii) New econometric evidence on the evolution of financial risks for the period 
1987-1997 is presented which is aimed at quantifying the effects of financial 
liberalization.  This evidence is obtained by estimating a conditional CAPM  in 
which the conditional variance-covariance matrix of portfolio innovations
follows a multivariate GARCH process.  The model specification allows testing 
for the effects of financial liberalization on the conditional variance and
riskiness of the banking and financial sector portfolios. 
(iv) Qualitative and quantitative findings are juxtaposed.  This allows insights into 
the extent to which financial markets recognized the increased banking and 
financial risks, which emanated from financial liberalization.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a conceptual discussion 
of financial liberalization and its association with increased risks. Section 3 documents 
the Korean experience. Section 4 summarizes the findings from the IM F/W orld Bank 
survey. Section 5 presents the econometric evidence on the evolution of banking and 
financial risks. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2. Financial Liberalization and Banking Risks: Conceptual Issues
The traditional approach towards financial liberalization, which dates back to the work 
of M cKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), emphasizes the benefits that would accrue from 
market determined interest rates and credit allocation decisions (see also Fry, 1997).
1 For a recent com prehensive overview of the Asian crisis see Hunter, Kaufm an and Krueger (1999).
3The potential benefits of financial liberalization include greater levels of financial
savings and investment, as well as improvements in resource allocation, which emanate 
from more productive investments. It is important to note that even though this
literature predated the economics of information revolution, which after all explained 
the raison d’être for banks and financial institutions, it nevertheless had an enormous 
impact on economic policy through the Bretton W oods institutions, since financial
liberalization became an important element of the set of policies associated with the 
‘W ashington consensus’. In spite of unsuccessful implementation of financial
liberalization in Latin America and other countries in the late seventies and eighties, the 
core of the financial liberalization thesis has remained intact, even though some
peripheral concessions were made, including acknowledging the importance of policies 
and institutions that are expected to address market failures (see Arestis and
Demetriades, 1999). These included the appropriate ‘sequencing’ of reforms, in the 
form of attaining macroeconomic stability and adequate prudential regulation of the 
financial system, prior to financial liberalization, as well as a specific order for financial 
reforms, with the liberalization of short-term capital flows being placed at the end of the 
reform sequence  (see for example M cKinnon, 1981).
W e posit in this section that the impact of financial liberalization on banking and 
financial risks is ambiguous. W hile financial liberalization typically offers greater
opportunities for diversification, by offering banks and other financial institutions a 
wider range of asset choices, which in principle should lead to more efficient portfolio 
choices, it may well expose them to greater risks, due to lack of expertise in operating in 
new markets, weaknesses in prudential regulation and/or moral hazard emanating from 
information problems.  The modern literature on financial liberalization reflects these 
two opposing forces.  The rest of this section draws on this literature to argue the case.
Capital account liberalization may in principle be expected to: (i) offer investors greater 
opportunities for risk diversification, achieving more effective insurance than purely 
domestic arrangements would allow, (ii) raise consumer welfare by allowing a smoother 
consum ption path, (iii) result in a more efficient allocation of resources by channelling 
the world’s savings towards the world's most productive investment opportunities, (iv) 
complement domestic savings, thereby increasing investment and promoting economic 
4growth without sharp increases in savings rates, and (iv) lower the cost of capital to 
creditworthy firms and small and medium enterprises (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996 
and Edwards, 1999). 
In reality capital account liberalization has presented important challenges and risks for 
policymakers (see, for example, Stiglitz, 2000). Specifically, the recent East Asian
financial crisis has shown that capital account liberalization can magnify the risks and 
weaknesses of the banking system, especially when capital inflows are intermediated 
through poorly managed and ill-supervised banking systems. The intermediation of
capital inflows through such banking systems usually leads to an expansion in banks’ 
lending activity as banks have more resources available for lending. This generates what 
is known as a 'lending boom'. Furthermore, domestic banks can exploit market
imperfections to generate over-optimistic expectations knowing that in case of default 
the government will be forced to bail out distressed banks and firms (M cKinnon and 
Pill, 1997). Since entrepreneurs and firms do not have enough information to assess 
banks’ signals adequately, they consider these signals as correct and hence base their 
investment decisions on such over-optimistic expectations. Consequently, they bid
eagerly for funds to finance their investments, further fuelling the lending boom
(M cKinnon and Pill, op.cit).2
One undesirable consequence of a lending boom fuelled by capital inflows is that it can 
exacerbate the maturity and risk mismatch between banks’ assets and liabilities. This is 
especially true ifcapital inflows are short-term and in foreign currency while banks' 
loans are long-term and in domestic currency. Furthermore, unregulated capital flows 
may be misallocated towards risky projects, speculative activities, the equity market, 
and cyclical sectors such as real estate. In the short run, the expansion of lending
activity bids up (inflates) the price of assets in these markets generating an asset price 
bubble. Such bubbles inevitably lead to deterioration in banks' portfolios as banks 
increase their holdings of 'inflated' assets and become heavily exposed to cyclical
sectors.
2 W hat is interesting in M cKinnon and Pill’s fram ework is that banks finance the lending boom  by 
attracting capital from  abroad. The authors refer to this process as the “over-borrowing” syndrom e.
5Domestic financial liberalization, which comprises mainly of relaxation of controls on 
interest rates, lifting of restrictions on the asset choices of banks and lowering or 
abolishing reserve requirements, can also significantly increase the risks in the financial 
sector (Fischer and Chenard, 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Stiglitz, 
1994).  Intense com petition that usually follows financial liberalization lowers profits 
for banks, which in turn erodes banks’ franchise values and lowers their incentive for 
making good loans. This exacerbates the problems of moral hazard and looting behavior 
in the banking system (see Hellman, M urdock, and Stiglitz, 2000; Akerlof and Romer, 
1993). These have the effect of increasing the riskiness of banks’ portfolios. A closely 
related argument is that financial liberalization erodes the protection provided by a 
regulated term structure and stable intermediation margin (Goldstein and Turner, 1996). 
This may intensify the moral hazard problem, encouraging banks to engage in lending 
to more risky borrowers in order to increase the returns on their funds. Indeed, Hellman 
et al (2000) show that certain types of financial restraints, such as ceilings on deposit 
rates, by keeping profit margins within certain limits can reduce reduce the riskiness of 
banks’ portfolios by limiting banks’ incentives to invest in assets that facilitate
gambling. Financial liberalization can also change the banks’ customer base with larger 
and better-known firms raising a larger share of funding through the securities markets 
or international markets. The resulting effect is generally deterioration in the risk
composition of the bank and financial sector’s loan portfolios (Fischer and Chenard, 
1997).
In principle, however, domestic financial liberalization can generate efficiency gains by 
removing various constraints on banks’ feasible risk-return frontier, which may result in 
lower overall banking risks (Hogan and Sharpe, 1984). Furthermore, financial
liberalization may open new profitable opportunities, which bankers could exploit and 
thereby avoid the erosion of their franchise value.3 Hence, while a case could be made 
that the impact of financial liberalization on the financial sector’s overall level of risk is 
ambiguous at the theoretical level, most studies usually associate financial liberalization 
with higher risks (Fischer and Chenard, 1997; Hellman et al, 2000).
3 However, Hellm an et al (2000) argue that greater investm ent opportunities, wide ranges of new
activities such as derivative trades and foreign currency transactions and greater freedom  to allocate
assets also increase the potential scope for gam bling by banks.
6An important element of domestic financial liberalization that has a direct impact on 
banks’ riskiness is reserve requirements on bank deposits. Reserve requirements are 
usually considered as tax on financial intermediation, which lower the profitability of 
the banking sector and hence may affect its attitude towards risk. Furthermore, required 
reserve ratios affect the level of liquidity available for banks and hence affect their 
lending decisions. M itchell (1986) finds that the impact of reserve requirements on bank 
riskiness depends on the way bank risk is measured and on the assumptions made about 
risk aversion. Specifically, if bank risk is measured by the ratio of banks' risky assets to 
total assets, then an increase in the required reserve ratio will drive down the level of 
bank risk. On the other hand, if bank risk is measured by the probability that the banks' 
profit will fall below zero, a rise in required reserves will also drive down bank risk if
and only if there is increasing relative risk aversion. The reverse holds, however, if there 
is decreasing relative risk aversion. Hence, at the theoretical level, the impact of reserve 
requirements on bank riskiness is also ambiguous.4
To sum-up, the traditional financial liberalization thesis, as well as its modern version, 
tends to emphasize its potential benefits, in the form of efficiency gains and
opportunities for diversification, which in principle should led to more efficient
portfolio choices; these may be reflected in both greater investment returns and lower 
risks, in both the real and financial sectors.  However, skeptics argue that because of the 
endemic nature of imperfect information and institutional weaknesses, associated
market failures, such as moral hazard, could well mean that financial liberalization 
instead leads to substantially increased financial risks and lower ex-post investment 
returns.  The Korean experience, to which we now turn, reflects both the traditionalist 
beliefs, which resulted in under-estimation of banking and financial risks, as well as the 
realities of increased risks through market failures and institutional weaknesses. 
3. Financial Liberalization in South Korea
In the last two decades or so, the South Korean financial system witnessed major 
liberalization efforts, especially on the capital account front. According to the
discussion of Section 2, these regulatory changes are likely to be associated with a 
4 Gelles (1991) shows that all the above conclusions hold for any bank with reserves and a risk-averse
utility function with a m ean-standard deviation fram ework that is consistent with expected utility.
7change in the level of the riskiness of Korean financial institutions. Before we present 
qualitative and quantitative evidence on the impact of such liberalization efforts on the 
riskiness of the Korean financial system, it is useful first to discuss briefly the Korean 
experience with capital account and domestic financial liberalization.5
Capital account liberalization
In the late 1980s, the Korean government accelerated the liberalization process of its 
capital account. The liberalization of the capital account took place mainly by relaxing 
controls on banks and corporations’ fund-raising activity in international markets and by 
allowing foreigners to invest in the Korean stock, bond and money markets. In
December 1989, foreign exchange banks were allowed to raise offshore funds by
issuing foreign currency denominated bonds or borrowing from the offshore accounts of 
other domestic foreign exchange banks. The main liberalization step, however, occurred 
in January 1992, when non-residents were allowed for the first time to invest in any 
domestic stock unless specified in some particular act, even though some limits were set 
on the level of total foreign investment.6 During September 1992 regulations on the 
overseas issue of foreign currency denominated securities were greatly eased.  The type 
of securities that could be issued abroad by Korean residents, restricted previously only 
to bonds, convertible bonds, bonds with warrants and stock depository receipts, were 
expanded to include negotiable CDs and commercial papers. Furthermore, the
authorization procedures necessary for the issue of securities were greatly simplified. 
During 1993-1998, the Korean government resumed the opening of its financial markets 
to foreign investors. For instance, in July 1994, the government partially opened the 
domestic bond market allowing non-residents to purchase non-guaranteed convertible 
bonds issues by small and medium enterprises (SM Es) subject to certain limitations. In 
M ay 1996, non-residents were allowed to purchase and trade bonds with warrants and 
to trade the stock index futures on the Korean Stock Exchange. In June 1997,foreign
investors were granted access to non-guaranteed bonds of SM Es and of conglom erates 
5 A m ore detailed discussion can be found in the appendix. The inform ation in this section and the 
appendix was obtained from  the Bank of Korea Annual Reports.
6 For instance, a 3%  lim it on investm ent by an individual foreign and 10%  lim it on total foreign 
investm ent were applied respectively and in the case of public utilities and those com panies in infant 
industry, the total foreign investm ent lim it is set at 8% .
8and by 1998, all kinds of securities stipulated in the Securities and Exchange Act were 
made available to foreign investors.7 Another important development has been the
abolition of ceilings on the purchase of domestic stocks by foreigners. In parallel with 
these developments, controls on foreign borrowing were largely dismantled during
1993-1995. In February 1993, overseas branches of domestic banks were permitted to 
supply loans to Korean residents engaged in the trading of the commodity futures or 
financial futures. Later in the same year,security issuers in foreign markets were no 
longer required to obtain permission before issuing foreign currency denominated
securities. Furthermore, the list of corporations and banks that could issue foreign
securities was considerably widened. By October 1996, the government dismantled 
most of the restrictions on direct foreign borrowings, enabling even non-manufacturing
SM Es to receive loans from abroad.
Interest Rate Liberalization
Unlike the capital account liberalization process, domestic financial liberalization
occurred gradually over a long period of time. At the heart of domestic financial
liberalization in Korea was the liberalization of interest rates. Since the early 1960s, one 
of the most important characteristics of the South Korean credit market has been the 
direct intervention of the state in the pricing of credit, which was mainly achieved 
through controls on lending, and deposit interest rates. In September 1979, the
M onetary Board abolished the maximum interest rate on bank loans. However, given 
Korean banks’ inexperience in setting interest rates, the Korean Bankers Association 
decided to link the interest rate on loans to the Bank of Korea’s rediscount rate which 
seriously limited the ability of Korean banks to alter lending rates. In July 1984, banks 
were allowed to charge different rates according to the creditworthiness of borrowers 
but within a narrow band. It is only in Decem ber 1988 that banks began to enjoy 
complete freedom over interest rate determination when controls on lending rates from 
banks and non-bank financial intermediaries were relaxed despite the fact that some 
controls on policy loans remained in place. In a move towards further liberalization, the 
interest rate on policy based loans were liberalized in July 1995 and, in January 1996, 
7 For exam ple, short-term  financial products such as com m ercial papers, com m ercial bills, and trade bills 
and CDs issued by financial institutions; and unlisted stocks and bonds.
9the Bank of Korea lifted the restriction on the size of premium a bank could charge over 
its prime lending rate.
The relaxation of controls on deposit rates in Korea was very gradual. Although in 1979 
the M onetary Board abolished the maximum interest rate on personal checking deposits, 
it is not until December 1988, when the M onetary Board liberalized interest rates on 
certain time and saving deposits, that banks started enjoying some freedom in
determining deposit rates.8 In November 1991, the scope of initial liberalization was 
extended to cover rates on long-term deposits with a maturity of 3 years offered by 
banks, mutual credit facilities, and credit unions. It is only as recently as November 
1995 that the Bank of Korea freed up the remaining regulated interest rates on bank and 
non-bank time deposits with maturity of less than six months.
The Bank of Korea concentrated its efforts in developing money markets by relaxing 
controls on the issue and sale of existing instruments and introducing new ones. In June 
1982, the call rate, which had been subject to an upper limit of 16%  was deregulated. In 
M arch 1986, the rates on negotiable CDs, introduced only in June 1984, were also 
liberalized. Further liberalization measures took place in December 1988 when interest 
rate on repurchase agreements (RPs), commercial papers of certain maturities (CPs), 
financial debentures and corporate bonds were fully liberalized. The major change 
however came in October 1989, when the government merged the call markets,
previously segmented into an inter-bank market mainly for banks and over the counter 
market between non-bank financial intermediaries and liberalized the interbank rate. 
Further liberalization was carried in the 1990s where the M onetary Board liberalized the 
rates on government and public bonds, shortened the maturity of RPs, CDs and other 
financial instruments, and significantly deregulated the bond market in November 1991. 
During the 1992-1995 period, the bank lowered gradually the minimum denominations 
of CDS and shortened the maturities of the RPs. In fact, by 1995 the Korean money 
markets  had become highly liberalized.
It emerges from this brief overview that in the last decade or so, Korean financial 
institutions witnessed major regulatory changes that may have increased the riskiness of 
8 Specifically, only interest rate on tim e deposits of m aturity greater than 2 years at banks, postal savings 
and credit unions and on tim e and savings deposits of m aturity greater than 1 year at m utual savings and 
finance com panies were liberalised.
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these financial institutions. In what follows, we examine this issue both qualitatively 
and quantitatively.
4.  The evolution of banking and financial risks: qualitative evidence 
This section presents the results of two sets of interviews carried out in (i) W ashington, 
D.C. during the autumn of 1999 and (ii) Seoul during April 2000.  The interviews 
followed a semi-structured questionnaire, which contained 21 questions relating to the 
factors that caused the crisis.  The respondents in W ashington were 15 officials of the 
International M onetary Fund and the W orld Bank who had direct exposure to the events 
surrounding the Korean financial crisis.  The respondents in South Korea were 29
private and public sector economists with direct experience of the financial crisis. They 
included senior officials of the Bank of Korea, the M inistry of Finance and Economics, 
the Korean Development Institute, the Korean Institute of Finance, private research 
institutes (funded by Korean chaebols), commercial banks (both Korean and
international) and other financial institutions.  Tables 1 and 2 present the sum m ary 
responses to seven questions that focus on the evolution of banking and financial risks 
and the effects of financial liberalization, as perceived by the respondents after the 
crisis.
The answers to these questions from both sets of interviews seem to support the view 
that financial liberalization increased the riskiness of the Korean financial sector. All the 
respondents in W ashington and 72%  of the respondents in Seoul thought that financial 
liberalization (defined as the removal of interest rate restraints and capital controls) on 
balance - taking into account the responses of financial institutions and regulators, -
increased the risks faced by Korean financial institutions. The survey also reveals 
another interesting observation: it shows that 73%  of the respondents in W ashington 
and 97%  of the respondents in Seoul thought that the institutional framework of
prudential regulation and supervision was not well developed to deal with the risks 
associated with substantial volumes of capital flows.  All but one respondent (i.e. 93% ) 
in W ashington and 86%  of the respondents in Seoul thought that Korean financial
institutions did not have in place adequate risk management systems. 87%  of
respondents in W ashington and 79%  of respondents in Seoul thought that Korean
financial institutions did not have the human capital or the expertise to manage the risks 
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associated with the intermediation of large amounts of foreign capital. These results 
suggest that financial liberalization may have resulted in increased banking and
financial risks due to inadequate risk management by financial institutions and expertise 
and due to weaknesses in prudential regulation.
Table 1: Interview responses of IM F and W orld Bank officials
Question  Yes No
Answer
M aybe Don’t know
M any economists believe that financial liberalization 
(i.e. removal of interest rate restraints and capital
controls) leads to higher investment returns. Do you 
agree?
10 2 2 1
Given that many economists do believe that financial
liberalization increases investment returns, do you
think that it may have played some role in creating 
over-optimistic expectations about investment
payoffs?
8 4 3 0
Some economists believe that financial liberalization 
leads to increased risks in the financial system, in the 
form of exchange risk, credit risk and interest rate
risk. Do you agree?
14 0 1 0
Did Korean financial institutions have in place the
risk management systems required to manage the
new risks that financial liberalization may bring
about?
0 14 1 0
Do you think that Korean financial institutions were 
equipped with the human capital and expertise to
adequately manage the risks associated with the
intermediation of large amounts of foreign capital?
1 13 1 0
Do you think that the institutional framework of
prudential regulation and supervision was sufficiently 
well developed to deal with the risks associated with 
substantial volumes of foreign capital?
0 11 2 2
Taking into account the new types of risks as well as
the responses of financial institutions and regulators 
to these risks, would you say that on balance
financial liberalization increased the risks faced by
Korean financial institutions?
15 0 0 0
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Table 2: Interview responses of South Korean officials
Question  Yes No
Answer
M aybe Don’t know
M any economists believe that financial liberalization 
(i.e. removal of interest rate restraints and capital
controls) leads to higher investment returns. Do you 
agree?
18 1 10 0
Given that many economists do believe that financial 
liberalization increases investment returns, do you
think that it may have played some role in creating 
over-optimistic expectations about investment
payoffs?
15 6 8 0
Some economists believe that financial liberalization 
leads to increased risks in the financial system, in the 
form of exchange risk, credit risk and interest rate
risk. Do you agree?
20 3 5 1
Did Korean financial institutions have in place the
risk management systems required to manage the
new risks that financial liberalization may bring
about?
2 25 2 0
Do you think that Korean financial institutions were 
equipped with the human capital and expertise to
adequately manage the risks associated with the
intermediation of large amounts of foreign capital?
1 23 5 0
Do you think that the institutional framework of
prudential regulation and supervision was sufficiently 
well developed to deal with the risks associated with 
substantial volumes of foreign capital?
0 28 1 0
Taking into account the new types of risks as well as 
the responses of financial institutions and regulators 
to these risks, would you say that on balance
financial liberalization increased the risks faced by
Korean financial institutions?
21 4 4 0
Finally, the survey results show that roughly two thirds of the respondents in both 
W ashington and Seoul believed that financial liberalization normally leads to higher 
investment returns.  Just over half the respondents in both W ashington and Seoul
thought that financial liberalization played a role in creating over-optimistic
expectations about investment payoffs in Korea.  These findings suggest that the
traditional beliefs concerning financial liberalization were at least partly responsible for 
the financial crisis for at least two reasons. Firstly, by emphasising efficiency gains 
through enhancing the quality of investment, they seemed to have contributed to
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creating over-optimistic expectations concerning investment payoffs.9 In fact, many
have argued that the creation of over-optim istic expectations is the main impetus behind 
the lending boom and the asset price bubble (M cKinnon and Pill, 1997). Secondly, by 
failing to emphasize the greater risk-taking opportunities that accompany financial
liberalization they generated complacency in relation to the recognition of risks and risk 
management both by the financial institutions themselves and the supervisory
authorities.10
5. The Evolution of Banking and Financial Risks: Econom etric Evidence
In this section, we investigate the extent to which the survey results, which indicate an 
increase in risks emanating from financial liberalization, were reflected in financial 
markets. To this end, we use an approach which exploits the information contained in 
the price index of securities issued by banks and other financial firms such as
investment banks, merchant banks and securities companies. Specifically, we examine 
the changes in the prices of the banking and financial sector portfolios in order to obtain 
information on the market’s assessment of the evolution of risks of the Korean financial 
system. In order to measure the riskiness of the banking and financial sector, we use the 
conditional Capital Asset Pricing M odel (CAPM ) in which the conditional variance-
covariance matrix of portfolio innovations is assumed to follow a multivariate
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (GARCH) process. GARCH 
models provide a flexible method for modeling time-varying conditional variances and 
co-variances and more importantly capture the empirical regularities found in stock 
returns (Ng, 1991). W e investigate the impact of financial liberalization on the volatility 
9 Edwards (1997) reaches a sim ilar conclusion in the context of the M exican crisis where he argues that 
the “financial m edia, academ ic analysts, W all Street experts, and m ultilateral institutions invented the 
M exican m iracle” which created a wave of over-optim ism  not based on real econom ic perform ance.
10 There is little doubt that another im portant factor responsible for inadequate risk m anagem ent was the 
moral hazard em anating from  the history of the socialization of risks in South Korea.  However, the 
im plicit provision of safety nets by the governm ent was not new.  It was present in South Korea since the 
early 1960s, yet no m ajor financial crisis was observed before 1997.  Government provided safety nets go 
som e way in explaining disincentives in m anaging risk, but they do not explain the increase in risk taking 
opportunities that accom panies financial liberalization.  Indeed, up to the early 1990s the socialization of 
risks was an im portant factor in ensuring the large investm ents undertaken by chaebols, m ost of which 
were responsible for transform ing Korea into a highly industrialized country.  It is conceivable that with a 
different set of beliefs, nam ely one which acknowledged the substantially increased risk taking 
opportunities associated with financial liberalization, necessary im provem ents in prudential regulation, 
risk recognition and m anagem ent would have taken place, even in the presence of im plicit safety nets.
Indeed, m any such im provem ents have now taken place in Korea itself, where the risks em anating from  
financial liberalization, are now widely acknowledged.
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of bank and financial sector stock returns by focusing on two areas of reforms, namely, 
domestic financial liberalization and capital account liberalization. Consequently, we 
examine the effects of (i) interest rate liberalization and relaxations of reserve
requirements on domestic deposits, which form the centerpiece of various attempts of 
domestic financial liberalization (ii) the relaxation of controls on capital flows, on
banking and financial risks. To this end, we augment the conditional covariance
equations of the GARCH model with indices of interest rate liberalization, reserve 
requirements and capital account liberalization.
The rest of this section describes our modeling framework, presents the data and data 
sources, including the construction of the relevant liberalization indices, and presents 
the main empirical findings.
TheM odelling Framework
The CAPM  due to Sharpe (1964), Linter (1965) and Black (1972) explains the risk of a 
particular asset or portfolio using the excess return on the market portfolio. Specifically, 
the conditional CAPM  model for an asset or portfolio i can be stated as follows:
E(rit / W t-1) = bit E(rm t/W t-1) = d Ht wt-1 (1)
W hereritis the return on portfolio i in excess of the return on the risk-free asset, rm tis
the return on the market portfolio in excess of the return on the risk-free asset, d is the 
aggregate measure of relative risk, Ht is the conditional covariance matrix with elements 
⎨hijt⎬,wt-1 is the vector of assets weights in the market portfolio m, and bitis the 
conditional beta of portfolio i with the market portfolio and represents the dependence 
on market portfolio risk. bitcan be defined as follows:
bit = himt / hmmt (2)
wherehimtis the conditional covariance between the return on portfolio i and the m arket 
portfolio and hm m t is the conditional variance of the market portfolio. In this version of 
the CAPM , all moments are made conditional on the information available at time t–1
as given by the information set W t-1.
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For estimation purposes, it is useful to decompose the actual return on the different 
portfolios into forecastable and unforecastable parts:
rit  = E(rit / W t-1) + uit (3)
rm t = E(rm t/W t-1)  + um t (4)
whererit and rm tare actual or realized returns and uit and um t denote the column vectors 
of the differences between realized excess returns and expected excess returns.
Substituting (1) into (3) and using the definition of bit, we obtain the following: 
rit = ( himt/ hmmt)πmt + uit i=1,2 (5)
where πmt = E(rm t/W t-1).For the purposes of this study, we include, in addition to the 
market portfolio, the banking sector and financial sector portfolios, hence i=1,2,
respectively.11
W e stack the innovations from the banking sector, the financial sector and the market 
portfolio into the vector etwhere








~ N(0, Ht) (6)
and the conditional variance-covariance matrix of asset innovations in (6) is assumed to 
follow a multivariate GARCH process (Bollerslev, 1990). Following Bollerslev, Engle 
and W ooldridge (1988), we assume that the innovation vector follows a simple
GARCH(1,1) process. The simplest generalization of the GARCH(1,1) model can be 
stated as: 
(et /W t-1) ~ N(0, Ht)
Vech(Ht)= w + y Vech(Ht-1) + Λ Vech(et-1e’ t-1) (7)
whereVech(.) denotes the colum n-stacking operator of the lower portion of a symmetric 
matrix,et is an (N·1) vector of innovations, w is a (½ N(N+1) ·1) parameter vector, and 
y andΛ are(½ N(N+1) · ½ N(N+1)) matrices of constant parameters. The specification 
in (8) has (½ N2(N+1) 2 + ½ N(N+1)) parameters in the conditional variance and 
covariances, which m akes estim ation of the system  of equations practically
unmanageable. In our simple three-portfolio multivariate GARCH(1,1) model, the
number of parameters to be estimated would be 78. In order to achieve tractability, we 
11 In principle, we could use data on stock prices of individual com m ercial banks, investment banks, 
securities com panies, etc. However, the inclusion of a wide list of stocks entails the estim ation of too 
m any param eters.
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need to impose some reasonable restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix.
Bollerslev, Engle and W ooldridge (1988)  suggest that the covariance matrix is written 
as a set of univariate GARCH models where the conditional covariance of each
portfolio is assumed to depend only on its own lagged covariance and the cross product 
of past forecast errors.12 This can be obtained by making the matrices y andΛ  in (8) 
diagonal. In this restricted model, the number of parameters would be 3N(N+1)/2, hence
for our three-portfolio model, the number of parameters to be estimated would be 18. 
Based on this specification, the element (i,j) of Ht is given by:
hijt = wij + a ij hijt-1 + b ij uit-1ujt-1 (8)
W e augment the conditional variance and covariance equations to incorporate measures 
of interest rate liberalization, reserve requirements on domestic demand deposits and 
capital account liberalization. As postulated in section 2, all these indices are likely to 
have an impact on the volatility of bank stock returns. In addition, the excess market 
return equation (4) incorporates indices on interest rate and capital account
liberalization.13 It is often argued in the literature that a shift from a ‘financially
repressed’ economy to a ‘financially liberalized’ economy is likely to result in more 
efficient allocation of resources, which has the impact of increasing the return on
investment.14 However, it is now widely recognized that in the presence of information 
asymmetries and contract enforcement problems, it is not necessarily true that the 
banking system will allocate resources to projects or firms with the highest return. 
Furthermore, in the presence of inadequate regulation and bank supervision, capital 
account liberalization may, in fact, have an adverse im pact on productivity. For
instance, in M cKinnon and Pill’s (1997) framework, domestic banks can exploit market 
imperfections and generate ‘over-optimistic’ expectations. As a result, entrepreneurs 
and firms will bid eagerly for funds to finance their investments, creating a lending 
boom and an asset price bubble. Price distortions and resource misallocations of these 
types have an adverse impact on the productivity of capital. Given these competing 
explanations, the impact of financial liberalization on market returns is ambiguous.
12 See also Ng (1991) and Engle and Kroner (1993).
13 There does not seem  be any strong theoretical justification for reserve requirem ents to have an im pact 
on the m arket return; hence this variable is not included in the m arket return equation. 
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The complete system of equations of our three-portfolio model using the diagonal
representation is given by:
rm t = a0 + a1 INT t + a2 CAP t + um t (9.1)
hmmt = w 01 + a11 hmmt-1 + b11 um
2
 t-1+ d11 INT t  + q11 RD t + g11 CAP t (9.2)
h11t = w 02 + a22 h11t-1 + b22 u1
2
t-1 + d22 INT t + q22 RD t + g22 CAP t (9.3)
h22t = w 03 + a33 h22t-1 + b33 u2
2
t-1   + d33 INT t + q33 RD t + g33 CAP t (9.4)
h1mt = w 04 + a44 h1mt-1 + b44 u1t-1umt-1 + d44INT t + q44 RD t + g44CAP t (9.5)
h2mt = w 05 + a55 h2mt-1 + b55 u2t-1umt-1 + d55 INT t + q55 RD t +g55 CAP t (9.6)
h12t = w 06 + a66 h12t-1 + b66 u1t-1u2t-1 + d66 INT t + q66 RD t +g66 CAP t (9.7)
r1t = ( h1mt/ hmmt)πm t + u1t (9.8)
r2t = ( h2mt/ hmmt)πm t + u2t (9.9)
whereINT,RD, and CAP are the measures relating to interest rate liberalization, reserve 
requirements on domestic demand deposits and capital account liberalization,
respectively.This system of equations can be estimated using the method of maximum 
likelihood assuming the conditional normality of the forecast errors,15 where the log-
likelihood function is as follows:
Ln L(f) = const – ½ ln
t
∑ |Ht|– ½ 
t
∑ ( 111 −−− ttt H' ee ), (10)
andf contains the unknown parameters in rm t,et and Ht.
Data
The Korean stock price index (KOSPI) is used as a proxy for the market portfolio.
W eekly data on KOSPI, the bank and financial sector indices for the period 7/1/1987 to 
29/7/1997 were obtained from DataStream.16 The three indices are expressed in local 
currency. The rate of return on the portfolio is defined as the first difference of the 
14 See M cKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) for a sem inal contribution.
15 The quasi-m axim um  likelihood m ethod, which provides consistent estimates provided that the first and 
second m om ents of the standardised distribution can be specified, can also be used if there are sm all 
departures from  norm ality (see Bollerslev and W ooldridge (1992)). However, in this em pirical work, this 
assum ption cannot be rejected and we use the m ethod of m axim um  likelihood.
16 Note that during this period, the Korean governm ent rem oved m ost controls on interest rates and 
em barked on a program  of capital account liberalization. Hence, this sam ple allows us to examine
whether the relaxation of various controls had an im pact on the riskiness of banks and other financial 
institutions. Given that the East Asian crisis m ust have generated powerful shocks to the return on the 
various portfolios, we exclude the last quarter of 1997 from  our estim ation sam ple.
18
logarithm ic stock price index and excess returns are com puted in local currency in 
excess of the overnight call rate (calculated on a weekly basis), which acts as a proxy 
for the risk-free interest rate. 
Figures 1a-1c in the appendix plot the market excess return series and the two-portfolio
excess returns series. These figures show that excess returns on the various indices are, 
on average, zero over the period (in fact the mean return on the three different indices 
are insignificantly different from zero during the period under study). The graphs also 
show periods of clusters of high and low volatility, suggesting the presence of
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) effects. The presence of these 
effects cannot be rejected (using LM  and portmanteau Ljung-Box tests) and the use of 
the GARCH modeling framework described earlier therefore appears warranted. 
The construction of the indices utilises the detailed information about financial reforms 
summarized in appendix II and obtained from the annual reports of the Bank of Korea. 
Specifically, the m easures of interest rate and capital account liberalization are
constructed using information and data obtained from the Bank of Korea, Annual
Accounts. They are assumed to take a value of one prior to any relaxations, and 
decrease in value whenever financial restraints are relaxed or removed; they are
thereforeincreasing with the severity of financial restraints, and decreasing as financial 
liberalization progresses. Specifically, for the construction of the interest rate
liberalization index, we use information on controls on deposit rates, lending rates and 
money market rates.  Strong positive correlation between the lending rate, deposit rate 
and money market indices allows us to average them out into a single measure, which 
we call ‘the interest rate liberalization index’. For the construction of the capital account 
liberalization index we use detailed information on the relaxation of controls on banks 
and corporations’ fund-raising activity in international markets and relaxation of
restrictions on foreign investment in the Korean stock, bond and money markets.
Figure 2a shows the movement of the interest rate liberalization index. As can be seen, 
it reflects the changes in the underlying policy variables reasonably well. The relaxation 
of lending and deposit rate controls in December 1988 is reflected in a sharp drop of the 
measure for that month. The measure then drops sharply during the second wave of 
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reform (1992-1995 period). During that period, most of the remaining controls on
deposit, lending and money market rates were abolished. Figure 2b plots the movement 
of the capital account liberalization index. The figure reveals that the index also reflects 
the underlying measures quite accurately. It shows a sharp decline in the beginning of 
1992 when the Korean stock market was open to foreign investors and domestic banks 
were allowed to raise funds in international financial markets. In subsequent years, most 
controls on capital inflows were gradually removed and this is reflected in the gradual 
decline of the capital account index. Figures 2a and 2b also show a high correlation 
(0.97) between these two indices. Clearly, this poses problems for estimation purposes, 
and we address this issue using Principal Component Analysis (see Theil, 1971) in 
order to summarise both liberalization indices in a meaningful way; we retain one 
principal component with an eigenvalue greater than one.17
The measure of reserve requirements on domestic demand deposits is constructed using 
data on reserve requirement ratios.18 The index, graphed in Figure 2c shows that reserve 
requirements on demand deposits increased significantly during the 1987-1989 period 
and remained relatively high until the mid 1990s, to decline to very low levels in 1996 
and 1997. 
Empirical Results
The following system of equations is estimated by maximising equation (10) using the 
BHHH algorithm:
rm t = a0 + a1 LIB t  + um t (11.1)
hmmt = w 01 + a11 hmmt-1 + b11 um
2
 t-1+ d11 LIB t  + q11 RD t (11.2)
h11t = w 02 + a22 h11t-1 + b22 u1
2
t-1 + d22 LIB t + q22 RD t (11.3)
h22t = w 03 + a33 h22t-1 + b33 u2
2
t-1   + d33 LIB t + q33 RD t (11.4)
h1mt = w 04 + a44 h1mt-1 + b44 u1t-1umt-1 + d44 LIB t + q44 RD t (11.5)
17 See also Dem etriades and Luintel (1997) or Arestis and Dem etriades (1997), who also advocate using 
(principal com ponent) sum m ary m easures of financial repression/liberalization.
18 Luarens and Cordoso (1998) argue that indices based only on the reserve requirem ent ratio and that do 
not take into account the continued changes in the tax base cannot capture accurately the restrictiveness of 
reserve requirem ents. This argum ent applies to the Chilean case where authorities have continuously 
changed the tax base to close loopholes and m ake the controls m ore restrictive. In the case of Korea, 
however, there have been no attem pts to change the tax base and as such the index we use in this paper 
rem ains valid.
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h2mt = w 05 + a55 h2mt-1 + b55 u2t-1umt-1 + d55 LIB t + q55 RD t (11.6)
h12t = w 06 + a66 h12t-1 + b66 u1t-1u2t-1 + d66 LIB t + q66 RD t (11.7)
r1t = ( h1mt/ hmmt)πm t + u1t (11.8)
r2t = ( h2mt/ hmmt)πm t + u2t (11.9)
where LIB represents the principal component of the financial liberalization policy
variables and RD is the index of reserve requirements on domestic deposits.
The estimated coefficients of this model are reported in Table 3 below, where the 
figures in parentheses denote the marginal significance levels. Table 3 shows that the 
model performs quite well in explaining the conditional variances of the bank and 
financial sector stock returns, as well as of the market returns. All the coefficients on the 
lagged conditional variances and lagged squared residuals are significantly different 
from zero at the 1%  level and are within a reasonable range. This suggests that the 
GARCH (1,1) conditional variance-covariance matrix is a good description of the 
behavior of the bank, financial and market sector stock returns. The table also reports 
results of the diagnostic tests performed on the residuals to provide an indication of the 
adequacy of the model. The Ljung-Box Q and Q-squared statistics on the standardized 
residuals ( tt hu
ˆ/ˆ ) and the squared residuals ( tt hu 22 ˆ/ˆ ), respectively, indicate that there is 
little evidence for residual serial correlation and heteroskedaticity for each of the
conditional variance equations. W e also carry out diagnostic tests as a simple indication 
for the presence of model misspecification. In particular, we examine the sign bias test 
statistic and the negative and positive size bias test statistics proposed in Engle and Ng 
(1993); the sign bias test investigates the impact of positive and negative excess return 
shocks on volatility which were not predicted, and the positive (negative) size bias test 
focuses on the effects of large and small positive (negative) excess return shocks not 
predicted by the model. W e find no evidence of misspecification, and although all these 
diagnostic tests are merely indicative, again, there does seem to be support for the 
GARCH (1,1) characterization.19
Some interesting observations can be made from Table 3. The conditional mean
equation for the market portfolio (equation 11.1) provides good evidence that abnormal 
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profits cannot be made on the market, on average, and therefore provides a reasonable 
basis for the use of the CAPM  model.20 However, we also find that the financial
liberalization index (reflecting domestic i.e. interest rate liberalization, and external
account i.e. capital account liberalization) is positive and significantly different from 
zero (with a p-value equal to 0.03). This suggests that financial liberalization, through 
these policy instruments, had a negative effect on the (excess) market return, which is 
consistent with the view that a liberalized banking system may not necessarily allocate 
investment funds to projects with the highest returns. 
Examination of the conditional variance equations gives consistent results. The
estimated coefficients on the financial liberalization index in the conditional variance 
(and covariance) equations are all positive, implying that increasing financial
liberalization over this period served to reduce conditional volatility and hence riskiness 
in the banking and financial sectors, in addition to the market sector. In four of these 
equations the coefficients are significant at the 10%  level, and in the other two
equations the p-values take values of 0.187 and 0.221. W ith regard to the estimated 
coefficients on the reserve requirement index, the results are again interesting; all the 
coefficients are negative and significantly different from zero at the 8%  level except for 
the market equation where the corresponding coefficient has a marginal significance 
level of approximately 16% . Hence, this suggests that, in general, the reductions in 
reserve requirements were associated with increases in conditional volatility (and hence 
riskiness) of (especially) the banking and financial sector stock returns. This may
suggest that reserve requirements played a prudential role, preventing large shifts
towards greater holding of risky assets in bank portfolios, thereby decreasing their 
riskiness.21
Table 3 also shows that the liberalization index and reserve requirements on demand 
enter significantly in the conditional co-variances of the banking and financial sector 
portfolios with the market portfolio i.e. equations (11.5) and (11.6) respectively.These
findings suggest that financial liberalization also affected the (non-diversifiable) market 
19 A full set of diagnostic results is available from  the authors on request.
20 Furtherm ore, in a prelim inary analysis, coefficients on lags of the excess returns on the m arket portfolio 
were found to be insignificant.
21 This evidence is also consistent with Gelles’s (1986) theoretical fram ework in which an increase in the 
required reserve ratio decreases the ratio of banks' risky assets to total assets (a m easure of bank
riskiness).
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Table 3: Conditional CAPM  with M ultivariate GARCH(1,1) 
Conditional Variance Covariance M atrix
Estim ated Coefficients of the M arket Portfolio




















Ljung-Box (6) for levels = 7.333 (0.291)
Ljung-Box (6) for squares = 2.999 (0.809)
Estim ated Coefficients of the Bank Conditional Variance Equation













Ljung-Box (6) for levels = 4.594 (0.597)
Ljung-Box (6) for squares = 0.319 (0.999)
Estim ated Coefficients of the Financial Sector Conditional Variance Equation













Ljung-Box (6) for levels = 3.968 (0.681)
Ljung-Box (6) for squares = 0.747 (0.993)
Estim ated Coefficients of the Conditional Covariance Equations

































Notes: The estim ated coefficients refer to the system  of equations (11.1)- (11.9) and the figures in 
parentheses denote m arginal significance levels.
risk of the Korean banking and financial sector. This is because (i) market risk is 
defined as the ratio of the conditional co-variance of the banking and financial sector
portfolios with the market portfolio (i.e. equations (11.5) and (11.6) respectively) to the 
conditional variance of the market portfolio (i.e. equation 11.2); (ii) both the
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liberalization index and reserve requirements enter significantly in both of these
equations.   Further evidence on this issue is presented in Figures 3a and 3b, which 
respectively plot the time-varying betas of the banking and financial sectors against 
time, during the 1987:1-1997:6 period.  These figures reveal that with two exceptions
the banking sector and the financial sector did not increase during the sample period. If 
anything, the figures show a steady decline in the betas after 1988. The only exceptions 
are M arch 1994, when beta increased slightly and became highly volatile,and the 
period from February 1997 onwards when the betas for the banking and financial sector 
started to increase sharply. It is important to note that during 1997 there was no change 
in our policy indices and hence the increase in betas in the latter case cannot be 
attributed to changes in financial policies. Instead the increase in bank and financial 
riskiness must be attributed to ‘bad news’, both from the region and Korea itself – the 
collapse of some of the largest chaebols such as KIA M otors - which increased
substantially the volatility of the stock market. 
6. Analysis and Concluding Rem arks
Our empirical findings suggest that financial liberalization reduced banking and
financial risks, as implied by the significance of the coefficients of the policy measures 
in the conditional variance and co-variance equations. The empirical analysis also 
suggests that financial liberalization, with two exceptions, reduced the non-diversifiable
market risk of the banking and financial sector.  In fact, our findings suggest that market 
risk only began to increase in early 1997, which coincides with ‘bad news’ in the period 
prior to the crisis. Thus, the econometric findings contrast sharply with the ex-post
qualitative survey findings, which demonstrate that financial institutions in fact became 
exposed to greater risks, through a combination of inadequate risk management
systems, lack of expertise and weaknesses in prudential regulation. 
The two sets of contrasting findings can be reconciled, in that the survey findings are 
clearlyex-post, having the benefit of hindsight which included an expert anatomy of the 
crisis, while the econometric findings to a large extent reflect the ex-ante views of 
market participants, based on available information at that time as well as their beliefs 
concerning the effects financial liberalization. In this sense, the econometric findings 
indicate that financial market participants had traditional views, which over-em phasize
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the benefits of financial liberalization and under-emphasize the pitfalls. Additionally, 
they indicate that information flows from financial institutions to financial markets were 
too slow or even inaccurate, as a result of (now) well known weaknesses in corporate 
governance, bad accounting practices and complex company linkages.   Thus, it is likely 
that traditional beliefs would have been shattered much earlier had ‘bad news’
concerning poor risk management practices hit the markets sooner. 
Importantly our surveys also reveal that expert opinion – at least in Korea, the IM F and 
the W orld Bank – has now shifted, acknowledging that, even though financial
liberalization may in principle offer potential benefits (such as greater investment
returns and opportunities for diversification), its practical implementation results in
greatly increased risks because of weaknesses in risk management and prudential
regulation.  Additional information from our surveys suggests that the safety nets that 
have historically been provided by successive Korean governments to banks and
industry may well have been responsible for holding back necessary improvements in 
risk management and prudential regulation.  Implicit or explicit safety nets clearly act as 
disincentives in managing risks, representing a certain type of moral hazard, albeit of a 
m ilder form  than the one postulated by M cKinnon and Pill (which posits that banks 
mislead investors in order to deliberately take advantage of safety nets). This form of 
moral hazard was critical in creating vulnerabilities in the banking system, including 
currency and maturity mismatches, which brought the Korean economy to a stage where 
even small shocks could trigger a full-blown financial crisis.
A conjecture that emerges from our analysis is that traditional beliefs concerning
financial liberalization, which over-emphasize efficiency gains and under-em phasize
risks, may well have been responsible for the thesis’ failure, by holding back necessary 
improvements in both the management of financial risks by financial institutions and 
prudential regulation. W hile this may, for some, be itself a somewhat speculative 
conjecture, it is certainly one that opens up fruitful avenues for further research.
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Appendix: A Sum m ary of the M ain Financial Reform s in Korea
1. Interest Rates
September 6, 1979:The M onetary Board abolished the existing maximum interest rate on bank loans to make it 
possible for banks to alter their interest rate on loans. However, the Bankers association of Korea, considering that 
banks themselves are not used to determining interest rates, decided to link interest rates on loans to the central 
bank’s rediscount rate. 
September 6, 1979: The m onetary board abolished the m axim um  interest rate on free installm ent savings deposits 
and the maximum interest rate on personal checking deposits.
M ay 17, 1984: The Board allowed seven nationwide commercial banks, local banks and the Korea Exchange Bank to 
engage in the negotiable certificate of deposit (CDs) from 1 June.
23 July, 1984: A narrow band for loan rates was introduced so that banks could charge different rates according to 
the creditworthiness of the borrowers.
December 5, 1988: Interest rate on loans from banks and non-bank financial intermediaries were fully liberalized.
December 5, 1988: Interest rate on tim e deposits of maturity greater than 2 years at banks, postal savings and credit 
unions were liberalized.
December 5, 1988: Interest rate on time and savings deposits of maturity greater than 1 year at mutual savings and 
finance companies were liberalized.
Novem ber 21, 1991: Lending rates liberalized further. Lending rates liberalized consisted of those on bank
overdrafts; on the discount of commercial bills by banks, mutual savings and finance companies; on the discount of 
com m ercial and trade bills by investm ent and finance com panies; on the purchase of firm s’ guaranteed papers by 
banks’ trust accounts; and those on overdue loans by all financial institutions.
November 21, 1991: The liberalization of deposit rates applied to those on short term, large denomination m arketable
instruments such as CDs, the sale of large denomination trade bills, commercial papers and RPs.
November 21, 1991: The scope of initial liberalization was extended to cover rates on long-term deposits with a 
m aturity of 3 years offered by banks, mutual credit facilities, and credit unions and mutual time deposits with a 
maturity of 2 years and more offered by mutual savings and finance companies.
November 21, 1991: The issue rates of corporate bonds with a maturity of 2 years and more were deregulated.
November 1, 1993: All lending rates (apart from those financed by the government and the bank of Korea’s 
rediscounts) were liberalized.
November 1, 1993: Rates on long-term  deposits with a m aturity of at least two years were com pletely liberalized. 
November 1, 1993: Interest rate on debentures and corporate bonds with a maturity < 2 years were liberalized.
December 1, 1994: Interest rate on bank and non-bank time deposits with a maturity of one year or more but less than 
2 years were liberalized.
December 1, 1994: Banks were permitted to set freely the interest rates on policy loans financed through the 
aggregate credit ceilings system within their respective prime rates.
July 24, 1995: Interest rate on policy-based loans through the aggregate credit ceilings system of BOK were 
liberalized.
November 20, 1995: The Bank and government freed up the remaining regulated interest rates on bank and non-bank
time deposits with a maturity less than six months and on their installment deposits with maturity less than one year.
January 19, 1996: The Bank of Korea lifted the restriction on the size of the premium a bank could charge over its 
prime-lending rate, which had been originally im posed in order to prevent a sharp run-up in bank lending rates in the 
course of interest rate deregulation.
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2. Developments in M oney M arkets:
M arch 7, 1986: The M onetary Board liberalized the rates on negotiable CDs, secured corporate bonds, and bank 
debentures.
February 13, 1987:The M B reduced the denomination of CDs from 100 million won to 50 million won.
December 5, 1988: Interest rate on repurchase agreements, commercial papers of face value greater than 30 million 
and maturity more than 91 days), financial debentures and corporate bonds were fully liberalized.
December 5, 1988: New commercial paper and conventional commercial paper were merged into one.
October 4, 1989: The Bank and the government merged the call markets, previously segmented into an inter-bank
m arket m ainly for banks and over the counter m arket between NBFIs, which expanded the size of the m oney m arket 
(call markets, CPs, CDs, RPs, TBs, Bankers’ Acceptance). After the merger, the interbank rate was fully liberalized. 
October 19, 1989: The BOK adjusted the maturity period of CDs issued by banks to other banking institutions from 
between 91 days and 180 days to between 30 days and 180 days.
November 21, 1991: The liberalization of deposit rates applied to those on short term , large denom ination m arketable 
instruments such as CDs, the sale of large denomination trade bills, com m ercial papers and RPs.
November 21, 1991: The issue rates of corporate bonds with a m aturity of 2 years and m ore were com pletely 
deregulated.
December 19, 1992: The Bank extended the m axim um  m aturities of CDs from  180 days to 270 days.
November 1, 1993: Interest rate on financial debentures and those corporate bonds with a m aturity of less than 2 
years were liberalized. Government and public bonds and M SB were also to be issued at prevailing market rates. 
September 3, 1993:The Bank lowered the minimum denomination of CDs from 50 million to 30 million.
July 18, 1994: The minimum maturities of CDs, high denomination RPs were shortened from 91 days to 60 days. 
July 24, 1995: The minimum maturities of short term financial instruments including CDs, high value RPs and high 
value CPs, were shortened from  60 to 30 days.
3. Portfolio Inflows
December 1, 1989: Foreign exchange banks were allowed to raise offshore funds by issuing foreign currency 
denominated bonds or borrowing from the offshore accounts of other domestic foreign exchange banks.
M arch 1, 1991: Non-resident Korean were allowed to sell foreign currencies exceeding US$ 50 thousand to entrust 
its proceeds to developm ent trusts with a m aturity of 2 years. Effective 15 July, the limit was raised in July 15 to 100 
US$ 100 thousands.
Effective from M arch 8, 1991: The governm ent perm itted the issuance of foreign currency denom inated securities to 
finance the im port of production facilities and equipm ent for which no dom estic substitute is available.
January 3, 1992: Non-residents were allowed to invest in any domestic stocks, unless specified in some particular 
act. A 3%  lim it on investm ent by an individual foreign and 10%  lim it on total foreign investm ent are applied 
respectively. In case of public utilities and companies in infant industry, total foreign investment limit is set at 8% .
September 1, 1992:Regulations on overseas issue of foreign currency denominated securities were greatly eased.
Type of securities may be issued abroad by Korean residents were expanded to include negotiable CDs and CPs.
September 1, 1992:Funds raised by the issue of foreign currency denom inated securities were perm itted to be 
deposited either in a resident account or an account with overseas branch of a domestic exchange bank.
Feb 1, 1993: Overseas branches of domestic banks were in principle prohibited from supplying loans to residents of 
Korea. But from  the above date, the governm ent perm itted them  to extend loans to residents of Korea engaged in the 
trading of the commodity futures or financial futures.
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April 1, 1993: The governm ent changed the system  whereby perm ission has to be obtained from  foreign currency 
denominated deposits could be issued to a reporting system. Instead of obtaining permission before issuing foreign 
currency denominated securities, now it only needed to be reported.
April 1,1993:Previously restricted to enterprises that had recorded a net profits in each of previous 3 years, issuers 
were widened to include those that had recorded a net profit on an accumulative basis over the preceding 3 years.
July 1, 1994:The government partially opened the domestic bond market allowing non-residents to purchase non-
guaranteed convertible bonds issues by SM Es subject to 30%  limit on total foreign investm ent per issue and a 5%  
limit per issue on investment by individual firms.
December 1, 1994: The ceiling on overall foreign investment in a listed company’s outstanding stocks were raised 
from  10%  to 12% .
M ay 3, 1995: Firm s were perm itted to undertake foreign borrowings directly for the redemption of foreign debts on 
onerous term for the import facilities where the firms were small and medium sized manufactures.
June 20, 1995: The government permitted the overseas issuance of exchangeable bonds.
July 1, 1995: The general ceiling on total foreign investment in a listed company’s outstanding stock was raised from 
12%  to 15%  and that for those of public corporations from  8%  to 10% .
April 1, 1996: The aggregate ceiling was raised from 15%  to 18%  of the outstanding stocks issued by a listed firm 
and from 10%  to 12%  for those issued by public corporation. The ceiling on holding of individual investors was 
raised from 3%  to 4%  of a firm’s outstanding stocks.
M ay 1, 1996:Non-residents were allowed to purchase and trade bonds with warrants.
M ay 3, 1996:Non-residents were allowed to trade stock index futures on the KSE.
October 1, 1996: The general ceiling was raised again to 20%  for a firm and 15%  for a public corporation. The 
individual ceiling was at the same time increased to 5% .
October 1, 1996: The government dismantled most restrictions on direct foreign borrowings, enabling non-
manufacturing SM Es to receive loans from abroad for the import of production facilities.
M ay 1, 1997: The limit on foreign ownership of Korean equities was raised to 23% .
June 1, 1997:Foreign investors were granted access to non-guaranteed bonds of SM Es and of conglomerates.
4. Reserve Requirements on Demand Deposits
Effective November 23, 1987: The M onetary Board raised the m inimum reserve requirement from 4.5%  to 7.0% .
April 20, 1989: A m arginal reserve requirem ent ratio of 30%  on the average increm ent of dem and deposits and tim e 
and saving deposits has been imposed. The marginal reserve requirements were abolished in February 1990.
15 February 1990:  The Bank raised reserve requirem ent ratios on tim e deposits, instalm ent savings deposits with 
maturity of 2 years or more and Household instalment saving deposit from 7.0%  to 8.0% . On all other deposits, 
reserve requirement ratio increased from 10%  to 11.5% .
February 8, 1991: The Bank introduced reserve requirements against mutual instalment deposits. 
April 23, 1996: The reserve requirement on time and savings deposits of more than 2 years was brought down from 
8%  to 6% .
April 23, 1996: The reserve requirem ent on checking deposits, pass book deposits, saving deposits, Tim e and saving 
deposits with m aturity of less than two years was lowered from  11.5%  to 9.0% .
November 8, 1996: The reserve requirem ent on tim e and savings deposits of more than 2 years was brought down 
from  6%  to 4% .
November 8, 1996: The reserve requirem ent on checking deposits, pass book deposits, saving deposits, Tim e and 
saving deposits with m aturity of less than two years was lowered from  9.0%  to 7.0% .
